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Abstract 
 
The relationship between monetary policy and financial stability has gained importance in 
recent years as Central Bank policy rates neared the zero-lower bound. The need to coordinate 
policy choices, to expand the scope of monetary policy measures and lastly, the need to target 
financial stability objectives while maintaining a primary objective of financial stability, has 
become essential. We use an SVAR model and impulse response functions to study the impact 
of monetary policy shocks on three proxies for financial stability as well as a proxy for 
economic growth. Our main results show that the Central Bank policy rate may be used to 
correct asset mispricing due to the inverse relationship between the policy rate and the stock 
market index. The results also show that, in line with theory, the exchange rate appreciates 
following a positive interest rate shock. Although the impact is only statistically significant for 
industrial production for the case of the UK, conventional monetary policy may indeed be able 
to contribute to financial stability when used in conjunction with alternative policy choices. 
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1. Introduction 
The relationship between monetary policy and financial stability became an important topic in 
the aftermath of the 2008-2009 Global Financial Crisis (GFC) as Central Banks lowered their 
policy rates in an effort to revive the economy and the zero-lower bound loomed3. Traditionally, 
price stability had been the main objective of Central Banks and hence, of monetary policy 
however, the crisis emphasized the need to implement alternative measures and to expand the 
scope of monetary policy to include a focus on the maintenance of financial stability while 
maintaining the primary objective of achieving price stability. Kryvstov et al. (2015) discusses 
the relationship between financial and macroeconomic conditions.  They note that financial 
stability conditions are an important part of monetary policy implementation as financial 
stability is a precondition for a well-functioning financial system.   
 
A number of SVAR analyses have been conducted on the U.S. Economy as well as other 
advanced economies. However, due to a lack of data availability and hence, shorter time series 
as well structural reforms in Latin American countries, SVARs have not been used frequently 
in econometric studies.  SVAR models, based on the VAR approach suggested by Sims (1980) 
have been used frequently in Japan, Portugal and the UK with three available examples being 
Nakahira (2009), Afonso and Sousa (2009, 2012), Elbourne (2007) respectively.  Mäki-Fränti 
(2003) points out that “the importance of monetary policy has further increased due to the 
diminished slack of fiscal policy and the practical difficulties to successfully conduct stabilizing 
fiscal policy”. A decade after the GFC, financial stability and the effective implementation of 
monetary policy remains a priority for many Central Banks, studying the relationship between 
conventional monetary policy and financial stability, in particular, the effect on different areas 
of potential vulnerability may play an important role in future targeted policy decisions. 
 
The purpose of this paper is to study the impact of short term interest rate shocks on financial 
stability for the cases of Chile, Colombia, Japan, Portugal and the UK.  Monetary policy 
influences the amount of money in circulation in the economy as well as the borrowing cost of 
money.  The countries chosen have autonomous, inflation targeting central banks, which 
provides the opportunity for more independent monetary policy decisions.  In the case of 
Colombia and Chile, this combined with a lack of empirical studies due to limited data 
availability makes for an interesting case study.  The UK dilemma in the midst of ongoing 
                                                
3 Advanced economies had limited options to further reduce policy rates and hence, employed unconventional 
monetary policy tools.   
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Brexit uncertainty and Japan’s unending battle with deflation and sluggish growth justifies the 
study of the UK and Japan.  Lastly, although Portuguese monetary policy is determined by the 
objectives of the European Central Bank, the effect on credit growth in Portugal is noteworthy 
considering Portugal’s economic recovery following a bailout from the European Union which 
provides the reasoning behind the inclusion of this case.    
 
A Structural Vector Autoregressive model is employed and impulse response functions are used 
in an effort to test the impact of monetary policy on financial stability. As in Cocriş and Nucu 
(2013), the impact of short term interest rates on three proxies for financial stability namely, 
credit growth (instead of loan-to-deposit ratio), stock prices and the exchange rate is studied. 
Industrial production is included as a proxy for the real sector and hence, for economic 
growth.  Although GDP growth would usually be included as a representative variable for the 
business cycle, the accuracy of an SVAR model increases as the number of observations is 
increased, industrial production is therefore included due to the data being available monthly 
instead of quarterly.  Our main results show that the Central Bank policy rate may be used to 
correct asset mispricing due to the inverse relationship between the policy rate and the stock 
market index.  The results also show that, in line with theory, the exchange rate appreciates 
following a positive interest rate shock.  Although the impact is only statistically significant for 
industrial production for the case of the UK, conventional monetary policy may indeed be able 
to contribute to financial stability when used in conjunction with alternative policy choices. 
 
The rest of the paper is as follows: Section 2 surveys existing literature; Section 3 discusses the 
methodology and the data used; Section 4 discusses the empirical results; and Section 5 
concludes. 
 
2. Literature Review 
Orphanides (2013) discusses the increased responsibility4 placed on Central Banks namely in 
the aftermath of the GFC, he finds that overburdening monetary policy may result in Central 
Banks once again acting as agents of the government and hence, may potentially reduce both 
independence and credibility.  Orphanides (2013) notes that by focussing on the single objective 
                                                
4 Full employment, fiscal sustainability and financial stability in an effort to strengthen weakened banks after the 
crisis. Borio (2014) notes that Central Banks have greater ambition following the crisis as they acknowledge that 
monetary policy may due more to prevent systematic financial crises however, great humility is needed in 
combination with this. 
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of price stability, doubts regarding capture could be held at bay.  Jorda et al. (2011), Drehmann 
et al. (2011), Schularick and Taylor (2012) note that the most important predictor of financial 
crises is strong credit growth financed by foreign liabilities and Jorda et al. (2013) use a cross 
sectional study to show that excess credit growth in the period prior to a peak is usually 
associated with a more severe recession in both the case of a normal recession as well as a 
financial crisis.  Low, stable and predictable inflation is necessary to achieve financial stability 
however, it is by no means sufficient (Poloz, 2015) while Bernanke and Gertler (1999, 2001) 
note that policy only needs to be acceptably sensitive to inflation forecasts. Alpanda and 
Zubairy (2014) find that under certain circumstances such as elevated household imbalances, 
monetary policy may have unforeseen side effects, Svensson (2014) has a similar view on the 
topic.  Kocherlakota (2014) notes that monetary policy is needed as regulatory tools may result 
in residual systematic risk and Stein (2014) has a similar view as he notes that the build-up of 
imbalances is not completely prevented by regulatory measures. Stein (2013), Kohn (2013) and 
Bean (2014) conclude that the financial system becomes more resilient and financial stability 
improves (in the long run) in the presence of regulatory measures.   
 
Khan et al. (2000) look at impulse response functions and find that sticky prices mean that 
optimal policy requires positive nominal rates with shocks affecting both the cost of credit as 
well as real quantities.  Dudley (2014) concludes that monetary tightening in the US during the 
great moderation should have been more aggressive in an effort to curb the overheating of the 
housing sector.  Adrian and Liang (2014) and Jimenez et al. (2014) find that periods of low 
interest rates may stimulate excessively risky behaviour by financial institutions and Farhi and 
Tirole (2012) find that this behaviour may also be amplified by the anticipation of policy 
intervention.  Adrian et al. (2018) note that monetary policy tracks financial vulnerabilities and 
conditions and Bean et al. (2010) notes that the case for “leaning against the wind” is stronger 
in the post-crisis period than in the pre-crisis period.   Aikman et al. (2016) use a threshold 
VAR to show that improved financial conditions and the credit-to-GDO gap depend on the 
level of the credit-to-GDP gap when compared to the trend level.  A credit-to-GDP gap that is 
above the trend, combined with looser financial conditions, initially leads to an economic 
expansion however, this may result in a recession over time as the economy unwinds and a 
higher credit-to-GDP gap also makes monetary policy implementation more challenging. 
 
Klaus and Woodford (2018) show that in the presence of housing subsidies and inefficiently 
low output, Central Banks who are concerned with the robustness of their PS expectation should 
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“lean against the wind” and target higher inflation and a higher output gap when housing prices 
are lower than expected.  Carney (2011) and Bauer (2014) show that high asset prices combined 
with low interest rates and financial stability for extended periods may lead to households 
becoming careless about their credit practices.  Asiriyan et al. (2018) considers monetary policy 
in a bubbly world where low interest rates result in frequent booms and busts in asset prices.  
Both monetary policy and bubbles have expansionary effects on the economy with bubbles 
having both an overhand effect as well as a wealth effect5.  Mendicino et al. (2018) find that 
macroeconomic impacts are magnified in periods where both the default rate of firms as well 
as that of banks is high.  They find that shocks to non-diversifiable risk, when banks are highly 
leveraged, has a significant impact on financial instability.  Côté (2014) looks at the case of 
Canada and points out that the circumstances under which it is appropriate to use monetary 
policy to “lean against the wind” should be more clearly defined.  Edwards (2015) considers 
countries with flexible exchange rates, inflation targeting systems and capital mobility and finds 
that there is significant spillover of policies from larger, advanced economies to smaller, 
emerging economies.  It is found that the Latin American policy rates are “Granger Caused” by 
changes in the Federal Fund rate and hence, destabilizing policies pursued by advanced Central 
Banks affect emerging economies’ policy rates.  The Mexican economy, which has a number 
of both European and U.S. banks is the focus of a paper by Morais et al. (2019) in which they 
find that firms that have a higher lagged share of foreign bank credit are more affected by 
foreign monetary policy and foreign banks have a tendency to soften lending conditions to firms 
with higher ex-ante interest rates in times of looser monetary policy. Bernanke and Lown (1991) 
and Calvo and Reinhart (2000) note that crises are often accompanied by bank credit crunches 
and halting foreign capital flows. 
 
Adrian and Liang (2018) note that accommodative monetary policy in the presence of financial 
frictions may result in higher risk to financial stability as financial vulnerabilities may increase. 
The intertemporal trade-off between improving current financial conditions and increasing 
future financial vulnerabilities should be considered when setting monetary policy.  Claessens 
et al. (2013) find that the monetary policy may affect the implementation of regulatory reform 
and Bean (2003) believes that financial stability should only be dealt with through regulation.  
Orphanides (2013) notes that monetary policy, as a substitute, is not an appropriate tool to 
restore global economic balance and Smaghi (2009) notes that unconventional measures are 
                                                
5 The overhand effect refers to resources being moved away from investment and the wealth effect refers to 
bubbles reducing the cost of intermediation. 
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warranted when the monetary policy transmission mechanism is impaired as shocks to the 
economy may be too large to be corrected by conventional monetary policy tools. Gelain and 
Ilbas (2013) note that when the primary objective of monetary policy is the maintenance of 
financial stability, the coordination of monetary and capital policy may not be optimal. 
 
Anderson and Cesa-Bianchi (2018) show that the impact of monetary policy on firms’ 
investment and borrowing decisions is affected by financial frictions with constrained firms 
investing or borrowing more in the presence of a strong financial accelerator and unconstrained 
firms investing or borrowing more in the presence of a weak financial accelerator.  Bernanke 
and Blinder (1992), Bernanke et al. (1999) and Kashyap and Stein (2000) also look at the credit 
view of monetary policy and the financial accelerator with Bernanke and Gertler (1995) 
considering the credit channel view and the impact of monetary policy on financial constraints 
via the financial accelerator6 mechanism.  Jimenez et al. (2012) looks at the impact of monetary 
policy on the supply of credit, they show that tighter monetary policy and weaker economic 
conditions substantially reduce loan granting, in particular loan granting by banks with lower 
capital or liquidity ratios. Kashyap and Stein (2000) and Aiyar et al. (2014) find that the amount 
of lending by large banks is not as significantly impacted by monetary policy as small banks 
are, additionally, small banks react to both the tightening of capital requirements as well as 
monetary policy whereas larger banks react to capital requirements only.  Jimenez et al. (2012) 
note that the crisis has shown that the use of monetary policy rates as a means of supporting 
credit supply seems advisable.   
 
IMF (2013) discuss unconventional monetary policy and note that the aim of unconventional 
monetary policy is to restore the functioning of financial markets and to provide additional 
room for monetary policy when policy rates are close to the zero-lower bound.  As IMF (2015) 
notes that price stability is not sufficient to achieve financial stability and Janet Yellen, the 
Chair of the Board of Governors of the U.S. Federal Reserve notes that: “Monetary policy faces 
significant limitations as a tool to promote financial stability… [However,] it may be 
appropriate to adjust monetary policy to “get in the cracks” that persist in the macroprudential 
framework.” Stein (2014) also notes that monetary policy affects costs for both borrowers and 
lenders as it “gets in all the cracks. The BIS supports the interaction between monetary policy 
and financial stability, “Financial stability is too large a task for prudential […] frameworks 
                                                
6 Bernanke and Gertler (1989), Bernanke et al. (1996) and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) also look at the effect of 
“financial accelerators”. 
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alone. Monetary policy strategies also need to […] lean against the build-up of financial 
imbalances even if near-term inflation remains low and stable.” 
  
Stein (2011) shows that in a simple economy where commercial banks are the only lenders, 
open-market operations may be able to regulate unregulated private money creation in an effort 
to prevent excess levels of short-term debt being issued. Lorenzoni (2008) note that an economy 
with financial frictions may be exposed to socially excessive borrowing and Bernanke and 
Gertler (1995) discuss the bank lending channel of monetary policy and conclude that this 
channel predicts a contraction in loans after an increase in interest rate when cash reserve 
requirements are binding and liquidity of banks is constrained. Van den Heuwel (2002) looks 
at the bank capital requirement channel of monetary policy which predicts that a tightening of 
monetary policy as a result of interest rate risk losses would cause bank capital to decrease. 
 
Sims (1980) suggested that VARs are a useful tool in an econometric toolbox with the aim of 
evaluating alternative macroeconomic models. Eichenbaum and Evans (1995) make use of a 
VAR analysis to investigate the effect of shocks (in monetary policy) on exchange rates in the 
U.S. and find that contractionary monetary policy results in a long-lasting appreciation in the 
exchange rate.  Cocriş and Nucu (2013) look at the relationship between financial stability and 
monetary policy in several Central and Eastern European countries and they find that, using a 
SVAR model and impulse response functions, in countries with inflation targeting schemes, the 
interest rate instrument is conductive to monetary policy.  In countries with fixed exchange 
rates, monetary policy is not conductive to financial stability except in the case of Bulgaria.   
 
Both Granville and Mallick (2009) and Cocriş and Nucu (2013) define financial stability in 
terms of the change in share price, the exchange rate as the units of local currency per unit of 
Euro and the bank-deposit ratio. Cocriş and Nucu (2013) go further to include the effect of 
monetary policy shocks on the real sector and include industrial production in the model.  
Dhyrmes and Dimitros (1997) look at more economically compatible SVAR models, they find 
that foreign interest rates and the real exchange rate are determinants of real output. Cavallari 
(2001) found that monetary shocks have no effect on real variables in the long run when 
considering a SVAR however, Lee and Chinn (2002) extended this model to include exchange 
rate data and found that monetary policy does indeed influence exchange rates.  Dias et al. 
(2012) use an SVAR model to analyse the impact of European macroeconomic policy choices 
on Latin American Economies and find that European fiscal policy affects Latin American 
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economies however, the impact differs for each Latin American country. Carrillo et al. (2017) 
study the impact of U.S. monetary policy shocks to the Mexican economy using a SVAR model, 
they find that U.S. monetary policy shocks explain roughly 60% of core inflation.     
 
Canova (2005) uses an SVAR model to show that floating exchange rate regime countries are 
less affected by changes in U.S. monetary policy shocks than countries with fixed exchange 
rate regimes. The effect of monetary policy in advanced economies on financial conditions in 
emerging economies is considered by Takáts and Vela (2014), they use a VAR analysis to show 
that emerging market policy rates have been less affected by advanced economy monetary 
policy in the time after the global crisis. Takáts and Vela (2014) also show that U.S. long term 
policy rates have a significant impact on both international reserves as well as capital flows to 
emerging economies. Elbourne (2007) makes use of an SVAR model to analyse the impact of 
monetary policy shocks on the housing market in the UK and finds that a temporary positive 
shock to the short-term policy rate leads to a decrease in house prices.  Afonso and Sousa (2009) 
make use of a Bayesian SVAR to study the macroeconomic impact of Portuguese fiscal policy, 
they find that shocks to government spending have a negative impact on GDP.  Lastly, Nakahira 
(2009) makes use of a SVAR to analyse the impact of monetary policy in Japan, the results 
show that the both the interest rate targeting regime as well as the quantitative easing regime 
implemented in Japan were effective in the period studied. 
 
3. Methodology and Data 
Hurwicz (1962) explains that a structural model is one in which the impact of “interventions”7 
is predicted. This paper makes use of a Structural Vector Autoregressive (SVAR) model to 
identify the impact of interest rate policy on financial stability. I apply this methodology to the 
cases of Chile, Colombia, Japan, Portugal and the UK.  
 
3.1. Methodology 
The starting point for the SVAR model used in this paper is a Vector Autoregressive model of 
order p (VAR(p)) which can be written in matrix notation as follows: 𝑋" = 	𝜙& +	 Φ)	𝑋"*) +	𝜀",)-.     (1) 
                                                
7 “Deliberate policy actions, or changes in the economy or in the nature of known types.” Sims (2002) 
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where Xt is a (K x 1) vector of endogenous variables, 𝜙& is a (K x 1) vector of intercepts, Φ) 
are (K x K) coefficient matrices and 𝜀" = 𝜀.", 𝜀0", … , 𝜀2" 3 is an unobservable error term with 
the following properties: 𝐸 𝑢" = 	0      (2) 𝐸 𝑢"𝑢7 = 0	∀	𝑡	 ≠ 𝑠      (3) 
 
and K is the number of variables, with 𝑈" 	= 	𝐵& ∗ 𝜀".      (4) 
 
The SVAR model is as follows: 𝐵&𝑋" = 𝑐 +	𝐵.𝑋"*. +	𝐵0𝑋"*0 + 𝐵,𝑋"*, + 𝑈"		   (5) 𝐸	(𝑈") = 0      (6) 𝑣𝑎𝑟	(𝑈") = 𝐷      (7) 
 
where 𝑈"	is a multivariate white noise process and 𝐵F are (K x K) matrices with i = 0, …, p. 
Equation (4) represents the relationship between the reduced-form shocks and structural shocks.  
Matrix D contains K(K+1)/2 elements while 𝐵&, 𝐵., … , 𝐵, contains (1+p)*K2 lastly, c contains 
K elements. A Cholesky Decomposition allows us to solve the model with 𝐵& being lower 
triangular.  The SVAR model implemented is based on that proposed by Sims (1980). A SVAR 
model allows for contemporaneous relationships between variables and also allows us to study 
the effect of a shock to one equation whilst other shocks remain constant. This makes the SVAR 
model more appropriate than a reduced-form VAR model in which error terms are correlated 
and hence, error terms cannot be decomposed into mutually orthogonal shocks (Schenck, 
2016), as follows: 
 𝑢F,𝑢FG𝑢HI𝑢7,𝑢JG = 	
𝑏.. 0𝑏0. 𝑏00 0 0 00 0 0𝑏L. 𝑏L0𝑏M.𝑏N. 𝑏M0𝑏N0 𝑏LL𝑏ML 0 0𝑏MM 0𝑏NL 𝑏NM 𝑏NN ∗ 	
𝜀,G𝜀HI𝜀7F𝜀JG𝜀F, 	
𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙	𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛	𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡	𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚	𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦	𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠	𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡	𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ	𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘	𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒	𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑥𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒	𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒	𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 .	(8) 
 
The variables are ordered as above due to the assumption that industrial production affects all 
other variables contemporaneously, short term policy rates affect credit growth, stock price and 
the exchange rate contemporaneously however, short term policy rates do not affect industrial 
production contemporaneously. Credit growth affects stock price and the exchange rate 
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contemporaneously however, industrial production and short-term policy rates are not affected 
contemporaneously by the credit growth. Changes in the stock price affect the exchange rate 
contemporaneously however, no other variables are affected contemporaneously. Lastly, the 
exchange rate does not have a contemporaneous effect on the other variables included in the 
model.  
 
The lag length is selected using Akaike Info Criterion (AIC) and Final Prediction Error (FPE).  
The AIC and FPE suggest seven lags for Chile, Japan, Portugal and the UK while eight lags are 
suggested for Colombia. 
 
A unit root analysis using the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test shows that we fail to reject 
the null hypothesis of the presence of a unit root for all five variables across the sample of five 
countries with the exception of the Central Bank policy rate for Chile and Colombia and the 
industrial production for Japan.  The level of certainty with which we can reject the null 
hypothesis of the presence of a unit for these variables increases when using the first difference.  
The first difference of the five variables is therefore used in all five cases as the variables can 
be characterized as having an order of integration of I(1) and hence the variables are non-
stationary.  The ADF test shows that the first-differenced variables have an order of integration 
of I(0) and hence the first-differenced variables are stationary.  
 
The five countries included in the analysis have somewhat autonomous Central Banks with 
inflation targeting frameworks in place.  These countries also have floating exchange rate 
regimes with Colombia having a managed floating exchange rate regime while the remaining 
four countries have a fully floating exchange rate regime.  
 
3.2. Data 
The global financial crisis emphasized the need to focus on both financial stability as well as 
price stability as the primary objective of Central Banks prior to the global crisis had been the 
maintenance of price stability. Three proxies for financial stability together with IPI to account 
for economic growth are included in the analysis with each proxy representing a sector of the 
economy which could potentially conceal financial stability risks (Cocriş and Nucu (2013)). 
Monetary policy is represented by the short-term interest rate in this paper, the Central Bank 
Policy Rate is used as available from the BIS.  
The relevant variables are as follows: 
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• Credit growth as a proxy for the banking system (BIS total credit statistics); 
• Stock index as a proxy for the capital market (World Bank calculations based on 
Datastream data); 
• The Exchange rate measured as local currency units per unit of U.S. dollar as a proxy 
for the foreign exchange market (World Bank calculations based on Datastream data); 
• Industrial production as a proxy for economic growth (World Bank calculations based 
on Datastream data). 
 
Data is available for Chile between 2003m8 and 2018m5, Colombia between 2002m4 and 
2016m5, Japan between 1991m10 and 2018m6, Portugal between 1999m11 to 2016m3 and the 
UK between 1991m10 and 2018m5.  Breaks exist in the data, the number of observations is 
based on a balanced SVAR estimation.  Monthly time series data is used, with the exception 
being credit growth data which is available quarterly.  The quarterly growth data is interpolated 
using Cubic Spline to estimate the monthly values.  Chile therefore has 177 observations, 
Colombia has 170 observations, Japan has 167 observations, Portugal has 197 observations and 
lastly, the UK has 321 observations.  Figure 1 plots the Central Bank policy rate for the five 
countries over the period between 1960 and 2019. 
Figure 1 
 
Data Source: BIS Statistics. 
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4. Empirical Results 
4.1 Orthogonalized Impulse Response Functions: Short Run Impact 
Chile 
Figure 2 
Responses of industrial production, the Central Bank policy rate, credit, stock market and the 
exchange rate in Chile to a Central Bank policy rate shock.  A 95% confidence interval based 
on 1000 replications is included. 
Response of Industrial Production to Central Bank Policy Rate 
 
Response of Central Bank Policy Rate to Central Bank Policy Rate 
 
Response of Credit to Central Bank Policy Rate 
 
 
 
	 14	
Response of Stock Market to Central Bank Policy Rate 
 
Response of Exchange Rate to Central Bank Policy Rate 
 
Figure 2 shows the short run impulse response functions for the case of Chile.  Industrial 
production experiences a decrease of roughly 0.25% after 2 periods, the level of the industrial 
production index continues to fluctuate around the benchmark value and returns to the 
benchmark value after 21 periods. When looking at the response of credit growth to an interest 
rate shock, one can see that a shock to interest rates has a minimal effect on credit, credit 
increases roughly 0.1% after 4 periods and returns to the benchmark level after 21 periods.  The 
level of the stock market decreases to a level roughly 0.5% lower than the benchmark level two 
periods after an interest rate shock.  The level of the stock market index experiences a slight 
fluctuation around the benchmark value for the first 19 periods after an interest rate shock is 
introduced after which point, the index returns to the benchmark level.  Lastly, the exchange 
rate experiences an immediate jump of about 0.35% however, this immediately returns to a 
level just above the benchmark level with a slight decrease of about 0.15% occurring after 7 
periods.  
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Colombia 
Figure 3 
Responses of industrial production, the Central Bank policy rate, credit, stock market and the 
exchange rate in Colombia to a Central Bank policy rate shock.  A 95% confidence interval 
based on 1000 replications is included. 
 
Response of Industrial Production to Central Bank Policy Rate 
 
Response of Central Bank Policy Rate to Central Bank Policy Rate 
 
Response of Credit to Central Bank Policy Rate 
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Response of Stock Market to Central Bank Policy Rate 
 
Response of Exchange Rate to Central Bank Policy Rate 
 
Figure 3 shows the short run impulse response functions for the case of Colombia, an interest 
rate shock results in a roughly 0.2% increase in the level of industrial production index with the 
level of the industrial production index returning to the benchmark level after about 18 periods.  
The response of credit to an interest rate shock is once again minimal, similarly to the case of 
Chile, with the credit decreasing to a level 0.04% below the benchmark level after 11 periods.  
The level of stock market index falls 0.8% immediately after an interest rate shock, after 7 
periods this level decreases further to a level roughly 1% below the benchmark level.  The level 
finally returns to the benchmark level after 14 periods.  The exchange rate experiences an 
immediate shock of roughly 0.1% of the benchmark level however, after 4 periods, this shock 
becomes negative.  In period 5, this impact is once again positive with a magnitude of 0.4%. 
After 16 periods, the effect of the shocks disappears as the level of the exchange rate returns to 
the benchmark level.  
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Japan 
Figure 4 
Responses of industrial production, the Central Bank policy rate, credit, stock market and the 
exchange rate in Japan to a Central Bank policy rate shock.  A 95% confidence interval based 
on 1000 replications is included. 
Response of Industrial Production to Central Bank Policy Rate 
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Response of Stock Market to Central Bank Policy Rate 
 
Response of Exchange Rate to Central Bank Policy Rate 
 
 
In figure 4, Industrial production decreases by 0.1% one period after a short run interest rate 
shock, after 2 periods this impact shifts to a level of roughly 0.9% above the benchmark level.  
The effect of the interest rate shock diminishes after roughly 12 periods with the level of the 
industrial production index returning to the benchmark level after 18 periods. The impact of an 
interest rate shock on credit is negligible with credit fluctuating between a level 0.01% above 
and below the benchmark level.  The level of the stock market index falls roughly 0.2% 
immediately after an interest rate shock and returns to the benchmark level 16 months after the 
short run interest rate shock. The exchange rate increases 0.1% immediately after an interest 
rate shock and returns to the benchmark level after 12 months. 
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Portugal 
Figure 5 
Responses of industrial production, the Central Bank policy rate, credit, stock market and the 
exchange rate in Portugal to a Central Bank policy rate shock.  A 95% confidence interval 
based on 1000 replications is included. 
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Response of Stock Market to Central Bank Policy Rate 
 
 
Response of Exchange Rate to Central Bank Policy Rate 
 
 
Figure 5 shows the impulse response functions for the case of Portugal, the level of the 
industrial production index increases by 1% two periods after a short run interest rate shock, 
after four periods the level of industrial production index decreases to a level roughly 1.4% 
below that of the benchmark level.  After 14 periods, the level of the industrial production index 
returns to the benchmark level.  Six periods after an interest rate shock, the level of credit 
increases to a level roughly 0.1% above the benchmark level and at the end of a twenty-four-
month period, the impact is minimal. The stock market index increases by 0.8% immediately 
after a short run interest rate shock, four periods after an interest rate shock the level of the 
stock market index decreases to 0.8% below the benchmark level.  Roughly 13 periods after an 
interest rate shock, the stock market index returns to the benchmark level. The impact on the 
exchange rate is minimal with the exchange rate returning to roughly the benchmark level after 
8 periods after reaching a maximum point of 0.2% above the benchmark one period after the 
interest rate shock.   
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The UK 
Figure 6 
Responses of industrial production, the Central Bank policy rate, credit, stock market and the 
exchange rate in the UK to a Central Bank policy rate shock.  A 95% confidence interval 
based on 1000 replications is included. 
Response of Industrial Production to Central Bank Policy Rate 
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Response of Stock Market to Central Bank Policy Rate 
 
Response of Exchange Rate to Central Bank Policy Rate 
 
In figure 6, the industrial production decreases by roughly 4% after 6 periods, this decrease 
then reverses and the industrial productions rises to a level 3% above the benchmark level after 
8 periods.  After 18 periods, the level of industrial production steadies. The impact on credit is 
negligible with the level of credit moving between 0.05% of the benchmark level for the 24 
months following an interest rate shock.  The stock market decreases to 0.5% 0f the benchmark 
level 8 periods after the interest rate shock, this increases to 0.5% of the benchmark level after 
14 periods.  The exchange rate decreases to roughly 0.2% below the benchmark level two 
months after an interest rate shock, this then increases to 0.4% above the benchmark level after 
8 periods.  After 15 periods, the exchange rate fluctuation steadies and the variation around the 
benchmark decreases.   
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4.2 Cumulative Orthogonalized Impulse Response Functions: Long Run Impact 
Chile 
 
Figure 7 
Responses of industrial production, the Central Bank policy rate, credit, stock market and the 
exchange rate in Chile to a Central Bank policy rate shock.  A 95% confidence interval based 
on 1000 replications is included. 
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Response of Stock Market to Central Bank Policy Rate 
 
 
Response of Exchange Rate to Central Bank Policy Rate 
 
 
Figure 7 shows the long run impulse response functions for the case of Chile.  Industrial 
production does not exhibit a significant reaction to a long run interest rate shock with the level 
of industrial production hovering slightly below that of the benchmark level.  The level of credit 
increases gradually over the 24-month period following a long run interest rate shock and 
reaches a level that is roughly 0.8% higher than the benchmark level.  The stock market index 
immediately reacts to a long run interest rate shock, three periods after the shock, the level is 
1% lower than the benchmark level.  24 Months after a long run interest rate shock, the level 
of the stock market index is 3% below the benchmark level.  The exchange rate increases to a 
level 1% above the benchmark level after 24 months. 
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Colombia 
Figure 8 
Responses of industrial production, the Central Bank policy rate, credit, stock market and the 
exchange rate in Colombia to a Central Bank policy rate shock.  A 95% confidence interval 
based on 1000 replications is included. 
Response of Industrial Production to Central Bank Policy Rate 
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Response of Stock Market to Central Bank Policy Rate 
 
Response of Exchange Rate to Central Bank Policy Rate 
 
In figure 8, the industrial production increases by roughly 0.3% two periods after an interest 
rate shock and after nine months, the impact of this shock has dissipated.  Credit declines 
gradually following an interest rate shock and after 24 months, the level of credit is roughly 
0.3% lower than the benchmark level.  The level of the stock market index decreases by roughly 
4% over the first 8 months following an interest rate shock, the level then plateaus.  The 
exchange rate reaches a level 1.5% higher than the benchmark level five months after the 
interest rate shock.  24 months after the interest rate shock, the exchange rate is at a level 1% 
higher than the benchmark level.  
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Japan 
Figure 9 
Responses of industrial production, the Central Bank policy rate, credit, stock market and the 
exchange rate in Japan to a Central Bank policy rate shock.  A 95% confidence interval based 
on 1000 replications is included. 
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Response of Stock Market to Central Bank Policy Rate 
 
Response of Exchange Rate to Central Bank Policy Rate 
 
Figure 9 shows the long run impulse response functions for the case of Japan.  The level of the 
industrial production index increases by roughly 1% after two periods, the effect of the shock 
has mainly dissipated after 8 periods.  Similarly to the case of Colombia, the impact of an 
interest rate shock on credit growth is not large with the level of credit growth decreasing to a 
level that is 0.05% below the benchmark level after 24 months.  The stock market index declines 
to a level roughly 1% below that of the benchmark 24 months after a long run interest rate 
shock.  The impact on the exchange rate is negligible.   
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Portugal 
Figure 10 
Responses of industrial production, the Central Bank policy rate, credit, stock market and the 
exchange rate in Portugal to a Central Bank policy rate shock.  A 95% confidence interval 
based on 1000 replications is included. 
Response of Industrial Production to Central Bank Policy Rate 
 
Response of Central Bank Policy Rate to Central Bank Policy Rate 
 
Response of Credit to Central Bank Policy Rate 
 
 
 
 
 
	 30	
Response of Stock Market to Central Bank Policy Rate 
 
Response of Exchange Rate to Central Bank Policy Rate 
 
Figure 10 shows the long run impulse response functions for the case of Portugal.  Two periods 
after an interest rate shock, the industrial production index increases by 1.4% with the level of 
the industrial production plateauing after 14 periods at roughly the benchmark level. The credit 
responds gradually to an interest rate shock with the level of credit increasing by roughly 1% 
after 24 periods.  The stock market index responds immediately following an interest rate shock 
with the level of the stock market index being roughly 0.5% higher than the benchmark level, 
after four periods this declines to a level 0.5% below the benchmark level.  After 12 periods, 
the level of the stock market index plateaus at a level roughly 2% below the benchmark stock 
market index level.  The exchange rate increases by 0.5% two periods after a long run interest 
rate shock, after 24 months the exchange rate returns to a level slightly above the benchmark 
level.  
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The UK 
Figure 11 
Responses of industrial production, the Central Bank policy rate, credit, stock market and the 
exchange rate in Colombia to a Central Bank policy rate shock.  A 95% confidence interval 
based on 1000 replications is included. 
Response of Industrial Production to Central Bank Policy Rate 
 
Response of Central Bank Policy Rate to Central Bank Policy Rate 
 
Response of Credit to Central Bank Policy Rate 
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Response of Stock Market to Central Bank Policy Rate 
 
Response of Exchange Rate to Central Bank Policy Rate 
 
In figure 11, the industrial production decreases to a level 4% below the benchmark level 6 
periods after an interest rate shock, the level then reverses as the industrial production reaches 
a level 2% above the benchmark level after 7 periods.  The level of credit increases gradually 
to a level roughly 0.2% above the benchmark level after 24 periods.  The level of the stock 
market index declines to 1.8% below the benchmark level after 7 periods, 24 periods after an 
interest rate shock the level of the stock market index is roughly 1% below the benchmark level.  
The exchange rate reaches a peak of roughly 0.6% after 12 periods with the exchange rate 
levelling-out at a level 0.3% above the benchmark level after 13 periods.  
 
Note: Vertical Axes – the deviation from the baseline level 
Horizontal Axes – the number of months after the shock 
Source:  Author’s estimates based on Datastream and BIS statistics, IRFs generated in Stata. 
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Table 1 
 
Note: - negative response, + positive response, * statistically significant response at 5% level. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
The financial turmoil caused by the GFC highlighted the importance of financial stability and 
resulted in the relationship between financial stability and monetary policy becoming an 
important element when policy mandates were updated in the period after the crisis.  In this 
paper, the impact of short term interest rate shocks on financial stability for the cases of Chile, 
Colombia, Japan, Portugal and the UK is analysed. The five countries chosen have autonomous, 
inflation targeting Central Banks with floating exchange rate regimes in place which allows us 
to analyse the impact of interest rate shocks on five countries with similar policy mandates.  
The set of countries presents an interesting case with Colombia and Chile being categorized as 
emerging economies with a history of limited availability of data, the UK and Japan facing 
political uncertainty and economic uncertainty respectively and finally, Portugal which 
experienced the most profound economic growth in the group of countries that received an 
injection of European funding.   
 
A SVAR model is employed and impulse response functions are used in an effort to test the 
impact of monetary policy on financial stability.  Credit growth, the stock market index growth 
and the exchange rate growth are included as proxies for financial stability while industrial 
production growth is included as a proxy for the business cycle.  Our results show that the level 
of industrial production as well as the level of the stock market index have a negative 
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relationship with interest rate shocks and hence, an increase in the Central Bank policy rate 
results in both the industrial production index and the stock market index decreasing in value 
in both the short run and the long run for all five countries. The inverse relationship between 
the Central Bank policy rate and the stock market index indicates that Central Bank policy rates 
may be useful in times of asset mispricing, which is in line with the results of Cocriş and Nucu 
(2013).  The inverse relationship between the Central Bank policy rate and industrial production 
indicates that the Central Bank policy rate may be used to control booms and busts. 
 
Credit growth increases in Chile, Portugal and the UK in both the short run and the long run 
following a positive Central Bank policy rate shock while credit growth in Colombia and Japan 
decreases in both the short run and the long run. Lastly, our results show that the exchange rate 
appreciates in both the long run and the short run following a positive interest rate shock in all 
five countries. The results are in line with theory as a positive interest rate shock, in a country 
with a floating exchange rate regime, results in currency appreciation as foreign investment is 
attracted.  Although the impact is only statistically significant for industrial production for the 
case of the UK, conventional monetary policy may indeed be able to contribute to financial 
stability when used in conjunction with alternative policy choices. 
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6. Appendix A 
Table 2 
 
Table 3 
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Table 4 
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